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Most urban studies discuss the extensive building of skyscrapers and malls in 
relation to economic growth, especially in the foremost global cities of the developed 
world, such as New York, Tokyo and Washington DC (Sassen: 1991). However, there is 
a scarcity of empirical studies investigating the degree to which non-Western and 
developing countries and cities take part to this global urban transformation (Deboulet, 
Berry-Chikhaoui, Roulleau-Berger: 2007). This article proposes to redress the balance by 
taking the example of Nouakchott in Mauritania and Khartoum in Sudan, as emerging 
capital cities under the impact of globalizationi. 
In the Arab world, one of its manifestations is the widespreading of prestige urban 
projects, inspired by the Gulf models, especially Dubai (Barthel, Verdeil, 2008; Barthel, 
2008). This paper discusses how urban projects in Khartoum and Nouakchott take 
inspiration from this hypermodern and fascinating urbanism (Schmidt: 2006, Lavergne: 
2009, Elshatshawy, 2010). Like many cities of the Maghreb and the Middle East 
(Elshatshawy, 2006; 2008), Nouakchott and Khartoum are undergoing massive urban 
transformations characterized by the construction of new residential areas and central 
business districts. Qatar, Kuwaiti or Saudi companies finance them. Previously, these 
cities did not attract significant global capital due to the fact that they were located 
between the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa. Even if they were unexpected, 
contemporary modernizing urban settings and financial over-investments in real estate 
show how they are entirely involved in globalization. 
These projects represent a strategy to trace a proper pathway to hyper-modernity 
emerging from geopolitical marginality on the international scene. New economic and 
financial opportunities, such as oil exploitation inflows, offer the chance to give these 
cities an image of successful development. Notwithstanding, this prestige urban 
transformation stands in stark contrast with the reality of these marginal States hampered 
by chronic economic poverty and social and political unrest. But this contrast is also 
symbolic: the management of such projects is of utmost significance for two countries 
that find themselves marginalised and whose Arab identity is a point of constant 
contestation. Actually, these countries are also part of the Sahel and Nouakchott and 
Khartoum can be considered African cities.  
Relying on long-term fieldwork in Khartoum and Nouakchottii, the article 
employs a comparative approach in order to expose the common urban dynamics 
resonating with the emergent model of “Dubaisation”. We will first demonstrate how the 
genesis of these urban projects is intricately linked to the discovery of oil and foreign 
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investments. An in-depth analysis of the main urban projects will prove that the State, as 
the primary landowner, takes part actively in this privatization process with new 
neoliberal policies. Then, the article will focus on conflicting issues arising within the 
local society, such as people displacement and claims to land, illustrating the side-effects 
of urban transformations in various popular neighbourhoods. Finally, this paper 
highlights the flagrant discrepancy between such luxurious, ostentatious and extravagant 
projects and the harsh realities within urban and national settings heavily characterized by 
poverty. 
 
1. Urban projects pouring out of oil holes 
 
A wind of change has been blowing through Nouakchott and Khartoum since their 
integration into the petro-countries circle. This has generated a two-tier process: these 
capital-cities have become new eldorados for foreigner investors, and they follow the 
path of Emirates’ development.  
 
In Khartoum, new office towers, stores, malls, lush golf courses and gated 
communities are rapidly sprouting on the banks of the Nile as well as within the wealthy 
districts. The image of downtown Khartoum is one of a vast construction site. The 
suburban areas are no less untouched by the construction of luxurious compounds. The 
airport, currently located at the heart of Khartoum, is due to be relocated from the 
downtown area towards the south-western fringe of the city. All of these physical 
transformations inscribed on the face of the city epitomize the new economic wealth of 
Sudan. Heralded by the discovery of crude oil, the growth is one of the fastest of the 
world in the last decade. In Sudan, the tentative oil production levels of August 1999 
have seen a significant increase and today the country prides itself on the production of 
500 000 barrels of crude oil per day. The economic growth of the country has been 
exponential reaching a high of 9% in 2006. However, since 1999, the emergence of this 
oil wealth has not effectively realigned the developmental disparities within the different 
regions of the country which have prevailed since independence. On the contrary they 
have reinforced the dominance of the capital city as the economic stronghold of the 
Sudanese State and furthermore contributed to a mass migration towards it in search of 
better economic sustenance (Denis, 2005). 
The oilfields that had been discovered in the 1970’s in the southern region of the 
country are at present overwhelmingly in the hands of foreign companies, especially 
those from East Asia. In a matter of a few years, East Asia has become the primary 
commercial partner of Sudan with 80% of exportation directed towards this region of the 
world and 34% of imports emanating from it. These foreign companies, generally 
Chinese (CNCP), control the oil industry and penetrate the whole of the Sudanese 
economy. Despite the influence of these companies, they are not the only presence on the 
Sudanese landscape. Other investment includes Arab and European capital. The latter 
interest has been ignited by a favourable economic climate that has been enhanced by the 
signing of the peace agreement between the Sudanese state and the SPLA (in the south) 
bringing an end to a protracted civil wariii.  
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Capital cities appear as entry points where the power and influence of the new 
class of global actors are clearly on display. A class of Sudanese, Arab and Asian 
businessmen has emerged thanks to petro-dollar inflows. The building called “Burj al-
Fatih”, with its sail outline that evokes the “Burj al-Arab” in Dubai, embodies this 
Sudanese change. The construction and real estate sector remain the most solid forms of 
investment adapted to the nature of a political economy based on patronage. Hence, 
petro-dollars continue to be reinvested in this sector within Greater Khartoum. This 
newly developed business class purchases and builds hotels, resorts, high rise villas… 
taking advantage of an increasing western humanitarian presence that contends with the 
fragile peace process and a full blown crisis in the Darfur region (Bartoli, 2006). These 
high sources of monetary revenue are exacerbating land pressure and driving up rents. 
Simultaneously, they are making the construction sector more dynamic.  
The discovery of oil has provided the Sudanese government with millions of 
dollars in surplus. This revenue is now increasingly being invested in real estate programs 
rather than the war effort. In 1990, only five bridges existed around the confluence of the 
Blue and the White Niles. Between 2005 and 2009, three more bridges were constructed. 
Currently, the edification of a bridge is underway to connect Khartoum to the new 
airport. The frenzied development of the urban space is also palpable within the transport 
sector. Road construction tries to follow the large increase of private vehicles that 
circulate the streets. Many tarmac roads are new, and some of them are reaching the 
furthest outskirts of the city. 
 
In juxtaposition, Mauritania has followed a similar path in recent years. In July 
2009, Mauritanians watched on the internet a video clip of the soon to be elected 
presidential candidate Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz. “The constructive change” video 
showed plans for a new modern city, dotted with skyscrapers, malls, pipelines, and 
luxury resorts. A running water tap symbolized the victory of Aziz-driven development 
on the desert. Although this virtual video still seems a mirage, Mauritanians were swayed 
to conceive of it as reality due to the announcement of oil exploitation that proclaimed 
economic development, success, and opulence. In 2001, the Australian oil company 
Woodside had discovered untapped supplies and has been exploiting them since 2006, 
fostering hopes of Mauritania becoming a new “Oil Emirate”. In late 2007, after an 
embezzlement scandal, Woodside sold its operating licence to the Malaysian giant oil 
company, Petronas. Various oil companies were granted new oilfields discovered within 
the onshore Taoudenni area: Total (France), Repsol (Spain) and CNPC (China). The 
experts estimated the potential reserves at 400 million barrels of crude oil: Mauritania 
could become one of the ten largest African producers. Actually, the daily extraction, 
initially estimated at 75,000 barrels, is a mere 15,000 barrels.  
This recent discovery of oil heralds a new phase of economic growth. It equally 
signals a political change: after being discredited due to the inauguration of an Israeli 
embassy in Nouakchott in 2001, the Mauritanian government has attempted to regain 
recognition on the international stage and to attract foreign funds. During a meeting in 
2008 between the former Mauritanian President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, Qatar’s 
Emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, and Sultan Ahmed Bin Selim (manager of 
Dubai International Development) an economic agreement was signed and investment 
opportunities were evaluated. These evaluations significantly focused on the banking, 
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energy, tourism, mining, and urban sectors. Nowadays, this economic transition is 
materially visible: the first historical colonial buildings located downtown were destroyed 
leaving room for a new central business district. The town council planned to build five 
skyscrapers. One of them will be the “Oil tower”. The Libyans are constructing a 30-
storey hotel. Kuwaiti businessmen have planned to build yet another in the north of the 
city. Gulf companies promoting urban development have their headquarters in new 
luxury buildings like the “Al-Khaïma City Centre”, the new luxury shopping mall erected 
in Nouakchott downtown. The Qatari Diar Real Estate Company is promoting a one 
million dollar luxurious resort twenty kilometres North of the capital. This project is 
called “Nouakchott new town”. Even if the financial investment is lower in Mauritania 
than in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco (See Barthel, Planel, in this issue), it is 
comparatively important for one of the poorest and underdeveloped country lacking in 
significant private investments. In light of these plans, the representative of Diar Qatari in 
Nouakchott, the former Mauritanian foreign minister and ambassador in Doha, stated:  
“Now Mauritania is the place to be. It is remote from the main Arab centres. The Qatar 
government is interested in alternative Arab countries such as Mauritania, Somalia, 
Sudan, and the Comoros Islands that are not very influential, but which have the 
potential to become a starting point to extend similar opportunities to other neighbouring 
countries. Other countries (Egypt, North African countries) are too influential and 
complicated”iv.  
 
Nowadays, these capital cities are attractive to foreigner investors, thanks to 
neoliberal policies and strategic political alliances. They benefit from the increase in 
revenues accrued from land tenure, and the transformation of petro-income into real 
estate projects. The State is not only encouraging them to invest, it is involved in these 
projects as one of the main actors of the urban metamorphoses.  
 
 
2. Is the Capital city up for sale? 
 
In the neo-liberal economic climate, the execution of prestige projects is 
accompanied by a certain number of conflicts pitting small-scale landowners, the State 
and important investors against each other. Segments of the city are for sale or reclaimed 
in order to concede a place for these colossal programmes. Thus, it is worth posing the 
salient question “is the Capital city for sale?” (Bredeloup, Bertoncello, Lombard, 2008). 
Unmistakably, the main actor of this privatization is the State. Since in such instances the 
State is the main landowner, the new context of speculation has serious implications for 
urban policies and priorities in urban planning.  
  
In Khartoum, the transformations of the Ministry of Urban Planning give evidence 
to the fluctuations and evolutions of the revenues accrued from urban property and land. 
In 1996, Johan Post indicated that the budget reserved for the construction of urban 
structures was extremely low. In addition, the fiscal prowess of the Ministry of Urban 
Planning was significantly weak. At that time, the Ministry was housed within a humble 
run down building, seriously lacking in material resources (Post, 1996). This description 
stands in stark opposition to the imposing buildings at the heart of the city that the 
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Ministry of Urban Planning occupies now. In 2005, the Ministry was well equipped with 
a state of the art Department of Cartography directed by highly qualified personnel.  
The increasing interest of the State in land tenure creates novel forms of public-
private partnerships. In 2004, the Governorate of Khartoum and the Ministry of Physical 
Planning and the National Social Insurance Fund signed a partnership agreement with 
Dal Property Development, one of the most powerful Sudanese private companiesv. The 
aim of the agreement was to establish the Alsunut Development Company. This public-
private partnership was convened to reactivate an “area of business prosperity” in the Al-
Mogran zone - the confluence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers. This $4 billion 
development project consists of two main phases: the first comprising the construction of 
a Central Business District (CBD) and the second a residential estate portion. Completion 
is expected by 2014 with 630 hectares of office space, 1 100 villas, 6 700 apartments 
affording living space for 40 000 residents and visitors, a marina and a golf course.  The 
site is expected to generate jobs for 50 000 employees (http://www.alsunut.sd/). The 
Sudanese government clarifies in its website that “this state-of-the-art, prime commercial 
real estate will act as a hub for Eastern Africa’s modern business market”.  
On the opposite bank of the Nile within the Abu Se’id area, another waterfront 
project “Medinat al-Noor” is under construction (http://ipc-kwt.com/al-noor.html). The 
urban structures remind of the Al-Mogran project: shopping malls, office blocks, high 
rise accommodation (communal buildings as well as individually owned villas), a zoo 
and a golf course. The zoo and the golf course equally feature in the Alsunut project 
mentioned above. The magnitude of “Medinat al-Noor” is such that an industrial zone 
has been envisaged as part of the project. Furthermore a certain quantity of space has 
been reserved for a police station as illustrated by 3D images. 
Land destined for sale is most often situated on the banks of the Nile and 
animated with its history. This is land that has been appropriated by those who have 
occupied it over a long duration of time and furthermore bears the marks of their 
identities and social biographies. Over the years farmers had cultivated the greatest 
expanse of this area only to find that their agricultural land was now being transformed 
into land reserved for construction. This is evident at the confluence of the Blue and 
White Niles where investors are intending to transform the face of Tuti Island, a rural 
haven of peace. The private Tuti Island Investment company, which has undertaken this 
urban development project, appraised at five billion dollarsvi, exhibits its impressive 
visual images and videos on the Internet (http://www.tuti-island.com/media.html) 
(Fig. 5). The company has close links with China and Egypt who guide the master plan 
with an engineering firm from Kuwait and a Malaysian subsidiary that execute the work. 
Before the erection of a modern suspension bridge (at a cost of 14-million dollars), 
achieved in 2009, access to the island was limited and dependant on the water ferries that 
crossed the river. The island had been a primary example of uncustomary and successful 
resistance to the thrust and pressure of urbanisation (Lobban, 1982). However, this 
resistance was curtailed by the desire of government planners and private businessmen to 
link the island to the other segments of the city via bridges (Omdurman and Khartoum 
North) in order to alleviate recurring traffic jams. In this way, they envisaged to both 
transform the island into a traffic node for the whole agglomeration and to create a 
business district.   
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Fig. 1: Main real estate projects in Greater Khartoum 
 
 
On a different part of the continent, in Mauritania, we can similarly observe how 
private or public interests motivate investment choices. For the Mauritanian State, it has 
been relatively easy to sell the land on the outskirts of Nouakchott. Created ex-nihilo in 
1960, the new capital city is surrounded by uninhabited sand dunes. There is no physical 
obstacle to urban sprawl… and speculation. In 1983, a law enacted the end of tribal rights 
in land tenure. The State became the landowner and a real estate investor and a property 
developer for luxury projects. A primary example of this phenomenon is the Socogimvii, 
the national society of building and real estate, created in 1974. In the 1970’s, during the 
urban growth caused by the droughts, the role of the Socogim was to construct urgently 
needed social houses. At present, it is promoting a high-rise housing estate composed of 
400 villas, named « Socogim beach », for the most solvent clients of the most influential 
banks (Choplin, 2009). Obviously, social housing projects are not any more the priority 
of authorities. 
In addition, when the State is not directly the property developer (Socogim case), 
it is promoting private investments with new legislation. In 2005, a law recognized 
officially the property developer profession. Since then, companies offer investments and 
short-term capital speculation (in real estate) or long-term capital speculation (in land). 
FCI is one of those societies, proposing investment funds, via its real estate subsidiary 
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“I’mar”. This company attempts to follow the Islamic financial principles, extremely 
popular within the Arabian Peninsula, promoting an “Islamic” quarter in the suburbs of 
Nouakchott. The future quarter, called “Sukuk”, is visible on the website 
(http://www.imar.mr): 50 villas, 60 allotments, and a central plot of 4 650 m! to become a 
central business district. The naming of this suburb connotes the diffusion of Islamic 
financial principles largely guided by those of the Middle East. The sukuk investment 
funds, developed by I’mar Company, are structured in compliance with Islamic lawviii. 
The sale of sukuk (Arabic plural. “title”) is primarily directed at Islamic investors who are 
prohibited by Shari‘a law from investing in conventional debt securities. Under these 
terms there is no risk of usury or earning interest on money loaning. As Ould Bah and 
Ould Cheikh (2009) write, even in Mauritania, “the pious local economy is increasingly 
connected to the vast network of the Islamic globalized finance”. The sukuk example 
demonstrates that international dynamics can converge with national interests. Urban 
changes are not only produced by foreign investments but by a subtle blending of the 
different interests of public and private actors. It is noteworthy that the State is 
augmenting its power to control land. Thus, it cannot be considered a victim of 
privatization precisely because it is instrumental in this process of privatization, which 
constitutes an easy manner to accrue instantaneous monetary wealth.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Socogim Beach, Nouakchot 
 
          © A. Choplin, Janvier 2008 
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Figure 3 : Main real estate projects in Nouakchott 
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Fig. 4: “Sukuk” Project, in the sandy outskirts of Nouakchott 
 
The plots are ready to be sold to private investors.  
The central area will be transformed into a central business district. 
Kite aerial photography, December 2009, © Collectif En Haut!  
http://www.mauritanie-decouverte.net/nouakchott_vue_du_ciel/index.html 
 
 
However, in December 2009, three years after the project’s inception, only seven 
houses have been built. Whereas the Sukuk northern suburb is awaiting the demand of 
buyers, the Qatari program “Nouakchott new town” seems to be on hold. In November 
2009, the Diar Mauritanian representative was awaiting a delegation. He stated: “The 
project will go on. We have been delayed because of the last coup d’état. With the latest 
political unrest, water and electricity networks remain unconnected. But, the master plan 
(realized by the French society Vinci) has been passed”. In response to our query about 
the possibility of the project coming to a halt due to the international financial crisis, he 
answered: “the project has not been interrupted but has been revised proceeding from 
bottom-up. First, we will focus on the five star hotel (200 000 $US).” Despite such 
reassurances, by December 2009, the Mauritanian project had disappeared from the Diar 
Website with the Diar representative still awaiting the delegation… In Nouakchott and 
Khartoum, the main prestige projects are precisely “projects”. This infers that until 
present they remain only in announcement form. On their websites, one observes that the 
master plans are “coming soon”. Declarations of cooperation are rife and signed 
agreements do not always culminate in tangible achieved projects.  
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Figure 5: comparative table of projects in both cities 
 
KHARTOUM NOUAKCHOTT  
Al Mogran 
 
Medinat al-
Nour 
Tuti 
Socogim 
plage 
Diar Sukuk 
Developers 
Alsunut 
development 
company 
Medinat al-
Noor company 
Tuti Island 
Investment 
private 
company 
SOCOGIM Diar company 
I’mar 
company 
Investment 4 billion $ 7 billion $ 5 billion $ 12 million $ 1 million $ 3 millions $ 
Main 
partnerships 
PPP: 
DAL Co., 
Khartoum State 
and the National 
Social Insurance 
Fund 
PPP: 
Grand Real 
estate company 
and Khartoum 
State 
Private 
investments 
 
PPP: 
Public real 
estate 
program + 
banks 
agreements 
Private 
investments 
PPP: 
FCI 
company, 
Mauritanian 
state, 
Shelter 
Afrique 
(international 
real estate 
investor) 
Type of 
projects 
Economic, 
commercial, 
residential and 
leisure resort 
Economic, 
commercial, 
residential and 
leisure resort 
Economic, 
commercial, 
residential and 
leisure resort 
Residential 
project 
Economic, 
commercial, 
residential and 
leisure resort 
Economic 
and 
residential 
resort 
Origins of 
contractors 
Dubai, Abu 
Dhabi, Malaysia 
Koweït, Egypt, 
Sudan, Egypt, 
Koweit, 
Malaysia, China 
Mauritanian Qatari Mauritanian 
Infra 
structures 
a central 
business district, 
1 100 villas, 6 
700 apartments, 
a marina and a 
golf course 
120 000 000m! 
Shopping malls,  
office blocks, 
high rise 
accommodation, 
a zoo and a golf 
course 
Residential 
Road networks 
400 villas 
high-standing 
A 5 star hotel, 
and luxurious 
villas 
50 villas, 60 
allotments,  
a central 
business 
district 
Websites 
http://www.alsu
nut.sd/ 
http://ipc-
kwt.com/al-
noor.html 
http://www.tuti-
island.com/medi
a.html 
http://www.so
cogim.mr/acc
ueil.htm 
http://www.qa
taridiar.com/ 
http://www.i
mar.mr) 
 
It is noteworthy that these “turnkey projects” follow international principles, 
deploying Anglo-Saxon terminology (expert, benchmarking, master plan, workshops, 
waterfront…), inspired from managerial and consulting processes (Barthel, 2008; Barthel, 
Verdeil, 2008). At the same time, companies are trying to adapt these international tools 
to local contexts. For instance, architectural styles evoke Arab cultural and historical 
influences and the project names are often Arabic signifiers (Al-Khaïma center refers to 
the nomadic tent; Burj al-Fatih takes on the name of Qadhafi’s revolution in 1969…). 
Indeed, some urban areas seem to be transposed segments of Dubai, complying with 
international standards. The international standards are embodied in the use of videos, 
websites and futuristic images as marketing props. Gaining access to these master plans 
and internet sites, that portray an ideal and simplistic picture of these iconically pharaonic 
projects, remains easy. By contrast, gaining more substantial information about their 
conception, the financial quandaries at their core, the identities of the diverse partners, the 
nature of the project management and the contracting owner, turns out to be a more 
delicate undertaking. The various actors are really reticent to divulge such information.  
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3. To whom does the city belong? 
 
This use (and abuse) of marketing tools invite us to go beyond the simple images 
and basic rhetoric in order to analyse the side effects on local context and populations. 
Gazing upon the advertising spots depicting the “urban future”, one might venture to ask 
to whom exactly is this city destined? For whom are these extravagant spaces provided? 
Arab investors? Local inhabitants? Moreover, we speculate why the central government 
and private investors desire to beautify and upgrade the cityscape when the majority of its 
inhabitants remain impoverished and in need of low-income housing projects. The 
obvious response would suggest that the priorities of citizens are not taken into account in 
this lifestyle vision of luxury and entertainment. Therefore, such advertising strategies 
stand in stark contrast with the needs and realities imposed by the national context. In 
Mauritania, any proclaimed steps towards modernity and prosperity are unfortunately 
taking a long time to bear the fruit of improving the everyday living conditions of normal 
citizens (Choplin, 2010). Indeed, the political video used by the new president during the 
last elections seems to be excessively extravagant, exaggerated and unrealistic. For the 
larger majority of Mauritanians and Sudanese, the promise of globalization gives rise to 
heightened frustration since it appears to be more symbolic than real. These expectations 
create a kind of apprehension and at the same time a huge desire to participate in this 
phenomenon of globalization. The new urban projects are characterized by paradox and 
ambiguity: on the one hand, they symbolize luxury and unabashed consumerism and on 
the other hand, modernity and hope.   
Moreover, the increase in competition over urban projects has sparked local 
conflicts over land possession. In Sudan, this phenomena is marked by a brand new 
building bearing the sign “Administration for conflict resolution”. Indeed, the fact that 
most of the projects are being erected on agricultural lands has changed the legal 
classification of the plots being exploitedix. This engenders conflicts surrounding their 
appropriation. In 2001, while the restriction of agricultural activity at Mogran did not 
trigger off an important revolt, we met some farmers, angry yet powerless to claim the 
right to stay on their land (Franck, 2007). In contrast, in January 2009, the project 
envisaged as Medinat al Noor elicited the first expletive outcry related to the use of land. 
The national newspaper al-Watan consecrates two of its cover stories to this topicx. The 
fact that valuable land is being transformed into a construction site would provoke the 
discontent of the owners with the decisions taken by the State of Khartoum to reclaim 
this land. The evicted owners would rise up in particular against the manner in which the 
authorities were meeting their target by selling the plots to a Kuwaiti company. They 
have authorised the beginning of construction work before ensuring that the previous 
owners have been compensated as well as neglecting to ensure that grievances taken to 
court have been addressed. In order to be audible and visible, the previous owners 
physically occupy the land already under construction. They vocalised their complaints 
by stating that they had neither been accorded adequate notice of their eviction nor been 
compensated before the actual sale of the land they occupied in 2006. They quoted that 
both elements were clearly stipulated by law and thus such behaviour was in direct 
contradiction to the legal frameworks of the State. This complaint was reverberated 
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outside the confines of the Abu Se’id area and markedly implicated land owners from the 
south west of the capital until Jebel Aulia affected by both this project and that of the 
construction of the new airport. 
Thus, step-by-step, in Khartoum, the political and business elite have designed a 
closed city, characterized by landscaped buffers, gated communities and residential 
enclaves, as is clearly demonstrated in the Al-Mogran project (Crombé, 2009). Whatever 
the intent, such choices have indirectly created a security belt that is taking form by 
isolating the urban air-conditioned elite and the lower strata of society from each other. 
These urban and political choices wilfully encourage fragmentation: the centre is no 
longer characterized by a shared public place but has become a place to be shared, 
between those having private interests. Accordingly, this globalization process is limited 
to selected spaces as well as people. In exclusively targeting the affluent, such projects 
contribute to the emergence of a model in contrast to the sustainable city and the “just 
city”, characterized by “material equality, diversity and democracy” (Fainstein, 2009; 
Marcuse, 2009, Harvey, 2009).  Essentially based on social injustice, we can ask what is 
the sustainability of such cities that create schisms by focusing solely on the “beautiful 
city” desires of a rich minority.  
From a different vantage point, these ambitious projects are equally vulnerable to 
the risk of being non-financially viable. Clearly, for the large majority of the local 
population the purchase of luxurious apartments is marked by superfluity. The volume of 
the local elite and the expatriate community is insufficient to cover the capital 
expenditure. The threshold of profitability is very high. Moreover, the effectiveness and 
feasibility become all the more pertinent. For instance, one might exercise a certain 
amount of scepticism regarding the master plans for Tuti Island. The three proposed plans 
completely disregard both the historical record of the island pertaining to land use as well 
as its uses in the very recent past. In the video imagery, the village has been obliterated, 
and the agricultural plots of land (still distributed in terms of irrigation units) are 
invisible. We are neither provided with the information explaining how the totality of this 
land is subject to complex rules of fragmentation directly guided by the precepts of 
Islamic inheritance law. Nor is it clarified that the complexity of this law accounts for a 
multitude of landowners on the island. By being presented in a sanitized and 
unproblematic process through the visual media, these projects seem to lose any authentic 
connection to the realities, characterized by land use micro-politics, cultural and financial 
stakes. Hence they become entirely deterritorialised virtual images standing outside the 
time and place they purport to represent.   
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Fig. 6: Tuti Island Project 
 
 
Source : (http://www.tuti-island.com/media.html). 
        In each pattern, the village is relocated, as if it was a simple infrastructure. 
 
Faced with these images, it is pertinent to question the future prospects of these 
urban modern clusters and the fate of the city in general. While such urban projects 
clearly target the affluent members of the local society, this does not eliminate the 
possibility that the city dwellers might take it upon themselves to appropriate these 
prestigious areas. For instance, in Khartoum, in largely unanticipated ways, the upmarket 
shopping mall Afra has increasingly become a social space and an attraction point for 
many citizens, including modest and poor ones. This idea is also valid for a trendy café 
constructed on one of the roundabouts in downtown. The success of this enterprise has 
certainly inspired a vogue that makes use of structures in the urban landscape as meeting 
points, spaces to have picnics and to consume Coca-cola… Similarly in Nouakchott, 
while the completion of the sukuk project is awaited, the local population takes advantage 
of this electrified area. Hence, it makes use of this empty space in the evenings to play 
cards or have tea underneath lighting provided by street lamps.   
 
 
 
In less than ten years, the faces of Khartoum and Nouakchott have changed due to 
the injection of billion dollar construction projects. Therefore, the oil discovery and 
globalization has provoked a spatial reversal: Sudan and Mauritania’s marginal positions 
have become an advantage. Obviously, such new strategic geo-political situation and 
connections entail important spatial and identity changes. Thanks to these two examples, 
we note how the capital city has become the showcase of internationalisation, a tool for 
attracting capital flow and for generating new inward investments and speculation on 
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land tenure (Berry-Chikhaoui, Deboulet, Roulleau-Berger, 2007). As the envisioned 
future morphologies of Nouakchott and Khartoum illustrate, these cities are striving to be 
competitive spaces in the globalizing economyxi. The modernity embodied in the 
Emirates states appears as the exclusive path towards modernisation. In spite of the 
differences – between the two countries - in policies, projects, the amount of money 
invested and the stage of the process (more advanced in Sudan), both are enduring the 
same influences.  
At present, both Nouakchott and Khartoum are looking forward to a future that 
may appear ephemeral. The comparison with Dubai as the quintessential post-petroleum 
city (Lavergne, 2009) stops short. In 2010, the Dubai urban-financial system has 
collapsed, echoing the transient nature of such projects. In light of the current global 
economic uncertainty, the potential investors and private firms could firstly withdraw 
from the margins of the Arab world. Recently strategic, this marginal position can 
become a cause of instability and fragility. Moreover, facing political and social unrest 
and poverty, it is increasingly difficult to believe in the feasibility of such prestige urban 
projects and in the possibility of their full achievement. Some of them, as Sukuk and 
Qatar Diar ones in Mauritania, are already delayed. Was it a brief glimpse of Dubai…? 
 
 
 
 
Barthel P.-A. (2008) Faire du grand projet au Maghreb. Géocarrefour, Varia, n°83/1, pp. 25-34 
Barthel P-A, Verdeil E. (2008) Experts embarqués dans le « tournant financier » : le cas des grands projets 
urbains au sud de la Méditerranée. Annales de la recherche urbaine, n°104, pp. 38-48 
Bartoli S. (2006) Khartoum et l’humanitaire : une approche spatiale de l’implantation des agences 
internationales. Master 1 thesis in geography, Univ. Paris 1-ENS Lyon, 124 p. 
Berry-Chikhaoui Isabelle, Deboulet Agnès (ed.) (2000) Les compétences des citadins dans le monde arabe 
: Penser, faire et transformer la ville. Tunis, Irmc-Khartala, 406 p. 
Berry-Chikhaoui Isabelle, Deboulet Agnès, Roulleau-Berger Laurence (ed.) (2007) Villes internationales : 
entre tensions et réactions des habitants. Paris, La Découverte, 325 p. 
Bredeloup Sylvie, Bertoncello Brigitte, Lombard Jérôme (ed), (2008) Abidjan, Dakar: des villes à vendre ? 
La privatisation made in Africa des services urbains. Paris : L’Harmattan, 354 p.  
Choplin A. (2006) Fabriquer des villes-capitales entre monde arabe et Afrique noire : Nouakchott 
(Mauritanie) et Khartoum (Soudan), étude comparée. PhD thesis in geography, Univ. Paris-1 Panthéon-
Sorbonne, 535 p. 
Choplin Armelle (2009) Nouakchott au carrefour de la Mauritanie et du monde. Paris : Karthala-Prodig, 
372 p. 
Choplin A. (Forthcoming in 2010) From the Chingetti mosque to Dubai towers. Extraversion, connection, 
and neo-urban society in a globalized Mauritania. The Maghreb Review 
Crombé L. (2009) "« Building Khartoum’s future » ?", EspacesTemps.net,   
http://espacestemps.net/document7752.html  
Denis E. (2005) Khartoum, ville refuge et métropole rentière, Mégapolisation des crises VS métropolite.  
Villes arabes en mouvement, Cahier du Gremamo. n°18, Paris : L’Harmattan, pp. 87-124. 
Elsheshtawy, Y. (2006), “From Dubai to Cairo: Competing Global Cities, Models, and Shifting Centers of 
Influence?”  In P. Ammar & D. Singermann (eds). Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Space in 
the New Middle East. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press 
Elsheshtawy Yasser (ed.) (2008), The Evolving Arab City. Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development. 
London: Routledge, 314 p.  
Elsheshtawy (2010) Dubai: Behind an urban spectacle, London ; New York : Routledge, 294 p. 
Fainstein S. (2009) Spatial Justice and Planning.  justice spatiale | spatial justice | n° 01 | 
http://www.jssj.org  
15 
 
Franck A. (2007) Produire pour la ville, produire la ville : étude de l’intégration des activités agricoles et 
des agriculteurs dans l’agglomération du grand Khartoum. PhD thesis in geography, Univ. Paris X 
Nanterre, 508 p. 
Harvey David (2009) Social Justice and the City. University of Georgia Press, 368 p. 
Lavergne M., (2009) Dubaï, utile ou futile ? Portrait d’une ville rêvée à l’heure de la crise. Hérodote, n° 
133, pp. 32-57. 
Lobban r. (1982) Class and kinship in Sudanese urban communities. Journal of the International African 
Institute, Vol. 52, n° 2, pp. 51-76. 
Marcuse P. et al., eds. (2009) Searching for the Just City. New York, London: Routledge, 264 p. 
Ould Bah M.F., Ould Cheikh A.W. (2009) “Entrepreneurs moraux et réseaux financiers islamiques en 
Mauritanie”, Afrique contemporaine, 231, 99-117 
Post J. (1996) The politics of urban planning in the Sudan. Habitat International, vol. 20, n° 1, pp. 121-
137.  
Sassen Saskia (1991) The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton: Princeton university press, 397 
p. 
Schmidt H. (2006) Economy of Fascination :Dubai and Las Vegas as examples of themed urban 
landscapes. Erdkunde, vol. 60, 2006, pp. 346-361. 
 
 
                                                
i We are grateful to Marc Lavergne, Sabine Planel, Riccardo Ciavolella and the anonymous reviewers for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We wish to thank Azza Yacoub and Jennifer Barak 
for the translation. 
ii The article is based on research evidence collected during long-lasting fieldworks in Sudan and 
Mauritania. A. Franck carried out a 4 years fieldwork in Sudan between 2001 and 2005 for her PhD  
(Franck, 2007) and again in 2009. A. Choplin’s fieldwork experience in Sudan consists of two fields 
research in 2003 and 2005, and of regular fieldworks in Mauritania (20 months), from 2000 to the present 
(Choplin, 2006). This article relies on data gathered during interviews with companies’ managers, civil 
servants in charge of urbanism and inhabitants. 
iii In January 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the central government 
of Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which has struggled for the 
independence of the South. As specified in the CPA, the Southern Sudanese have the right to decide 
whether Southern Sudan will become an independent nation or whether it will remain part of a unified 
Sudan in January 2011.  
iv Interview, Nouakchott, 22/01/2009 
v The DAL Group consists of independent companies operating in the consumer, industrial, agricultural and 
property development sectors, with each offshoot playing a leading role in its own field. They distribute 
Coca Cola, and represent Mitsubishi group, Caterpillar… 
vi « Khartoum investors eye Tuti Island », Middle East Online, 2008-03-24, http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/?id=25011 
vii Socogim: Société nationale de construction et de gestion immobilière 
viii See « Finance islamique : les Sukuk gagnent du terrain », La tribune n°416, 20/09/08 ; « Interview M. 
Issa Cheiguer, PDG FCI », World Investment news, 02/04/2008 
ix Agricultural land s measured in feddans (hectares) whereas land reserved for construction is measured in 
m2. In consequence, the compensation paid to evicted agriculturalists is derisory in relation to the value of 
resale.    
x “The matter of compensation following the reclamation of the sawagui of Abu Se’id” Al-Watan, 23rd 
January 2009.  “Land owners of Abu Se’id lay siege to the construction site of Medinat al Noor” Al -
Watan, 3
rd
 February 2009. 
xi It is noteworthy that Mauritanian and Sudanese presidents, Mohamed Ould Abdel Azziz and Omar Al-
Bachir met them in Nouakchott in December 2009. They planned to reinforce the economic cooperation. 
